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Firearm Retailers’ Willingness to Participate
in an Illegal Gun Purchase
Garen Wintemute
ABSTRACT Firearm-related violence is a significant public health and public safety
problem for cities in the USA, and licensed firearm retailers are an important source of
the guns used in that violence. Using a scripted telephone interview, we screened a
sample of licensed retailers in California to assess their willingness to participate in the
surrogate or “straw” purchase of a handgun; such purchases are illegal under federal
law. Of 149 retailers who provided a response, 30 (20.1%) agreed to participate. In
multivariate analysis, pawnbrokers were more likely to agree than were gun dealers
(odds ratio 6.58, 95% confidence interval 1.99–21.71). Sales of handguns that were
later subjected to ownership tracing (a proxy measure for a gun’s use in crime) were not
more frequent among retailers who agreed to participate than among others, and other
findings were unexpected as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly 315,000 violent crimes, including an estimated 10,886 homicides, were
committed with ﬁrearms in the United States in 2008.
1,2 Firearm violence is
particularly a problem for America’s major urban areas,
3 and federally licensed
retailers are important sources of these guns.
4 Of persons incarcerated during the
1990s for gun crimes, 12% to 19% of those in state prisons
5 and 19% of those in
federal prisons
6 purchased their guns personally from a gun dealer or pawnshop. An
unknown but substantial number of others illegally use surrogate or “straw”
purchasers to acquire guns from licensed retailers indirectly.
7 Licensed retailers who
are themselves corrupt are linked to nearly half (48%) of guns that are trafﬁcked—
intentionally diverted into illegal commerce.
7
Linking Retailers to Crime Guns
Several methods are available to identify retailers who are frequent sources of crime
guns. The most common relies on available data; it is to measure the number of guns
a retailer sells that are later subjected to ownership traces by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).
8 Traces are performed by ATF on guns
recovered by police agencies worldwide, usually in connection with a crime. A
completed trace begins with the gun’s manufacture and ends with its ﬁrst retail sale.
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865In 1998, just 1,020 (1.2%) of 83,272 licensed retailers accounted for 57.4% of all
traced guns.
9
Importantly, the number of guns traced to a retailer is not simply a function of
the number of guns that retailer sells. A minority of retailers is associated with
disproportionate, not just frequent, sales of crime guns.
10,11 In a California study of
retailers with at least 100 handgun sales per year, the 11.2% of retailers with
disproportionate sales of crime guns accounted for 17.9% of all handguns sold by
study subjects but 46.1% of handguns that were later used in violent or ﬁrearm-
related crimes.
10,11 Several factors are associated with disproportionate sales of
crime guns.
10,11 Most are characteristics of the retailers or of their clienteles, not of
the communities in which the retailers are located. These ﬁndings have suggested a
second available data strategy for identifying retailers who may be important
sources of crime guns: determining the percentage of each retailer’s proposed sales
that are denied when criminal background checks show prospective purchasers to be
prohibited persons.
10,11
While available data may yield useful screening tools, they do not address the
question of retailer intent. A key question remains: Do disproportionate sales of
crime guns reﬂect purposeful behavior by the retailer, simple negligence, or
circumstances beyond the retailer’s control?
Several investigations have therefore assessed retailer behavior directly, either by
passive monitoring or by observing the response to a predetermined stimulus, such
as a proposed illegal gun purchase. A large study of gun shows demonstrated that
straw purchases were to some extent concentrated at “hotspot” retailers and
sometimes appeared to involve the full and knowledgeable participation of the
retailer.
12 Working undercover, police ofﬁcers or private investigators from several
major cities have proposed sham straw purchases to selected retailers, already
identiﬁed as important sources of crime guns, to determine their willingness to
participate in illegal sales.
13,14 Investigators working for the city of New York
recently screened retailers at seven gun shows and proposed sham straw purchases
to those whose behavior suggested that they would be “vulnerable targets.”
15 The
positive predictive value of the screening process, the details of which were not
published, was 94% (16/17).
Direct, on-site observation provides persuasive evidence but is not feasible on a
large scale. Costs for the New York gun show study totaled at least $3,311 per gun
seller screened and $30,000 per gun seller tested.
15,16 A much less expensive
approach is to solicit participation in an illegal act, such as a straw purchase, by
telephone. Sorenson and Vittes used this technique to assess 120 licensed gun
retailers, selected from an Internet business directory, in 20 large cities across the
country.
17 Of the 40 retailers who were told that “my girl/boyfriend needs me to buy
her/him a handgun,” 21 (52.5%) agreed to make the sale.
The Current Study
This study applies the Sorenson and Vittes technique, with some modiﬁcations, to a
larger population of retailers about whom a great deal of additional information is
available.
11 This information concerns sales of traced guns, gun sales overall, the
nature of guns sold, attributes of the clientele, and characteristics of the speciﬁc
place and larger community in which the retailer is located. Our primary hypothesis
was that retailers who agreed to participate in a straw purchase would be more
likely than others to be identiﬁable independently as important sources of traced
crime guns. Based on our prior ﬁndings,
10,11 we also hypothesized that retailers who
WINTEMUTE 866agreed to participate would sell more guns than others did, would sell proportion-
ately more inexpensive guns, would have a higher percentage of denied purchases,
and would more likely be pawnbrokers and located in a central city or other urban
environment.
METHODS
Study Design, Setting, and Subjects
This is a cross-sectional study. The 300 subjects, all federally licensed handgun
retailers in California, were initially the topic of a case–control study of retailers
with disproportionate sales of crime guns. The formation and characteristics of the
study population have previously been described.
11 In brief, subjects were identiﬁed
from among all retailers who sold handguns for at least one of the years 1998–2003
and averaged at least 50 handgun sales annually for their years in business during
that period. Sixty retailers were associated with disproportionate sales of handguns
that were later traced. “Disproportionate” was deﬁned as having an actual number
of traced handguns that exceeded the number predicted by aggregate data for all
eligible retailers, by a margin that reached statistical signiﬁcance (pG0.05). The other
240 retailers were a random sample of the eligible non-cases, serving as controls.
Variables and Data Collection
The California Department of Justice (CDOJ) provided records for handgun sales by
licensed retailers and for proposed sales that CDOJ denied under laws prohibiting
felons, violent misdemeanants, and certain others from purchasing ﬁrearms (in
California, almost all transfers of ﬁrearms, including those between private parties,
must be processed by a licensed retailer). ATF provided records for all gun traces
initiated during the study period, regardless of the location of the requesting law
enforcement agency. CDOJ and ATF records covered the years 1998–2003.
Variables obtained from these data fell into three classes: relating to the retailer,
to the retailer’s clientele (including those whose purchases were denied), and to the
general socioeconomic environment of the county in which the retailer was
located.
10,11 A variable for urbanicity of the retailer’s speciﬁc location was taken
from site visits, which were conducted by the author during August–December 2004
(with few exceptions, other site visit variables had been shown not to be associated
with disproportionate sales of crime guns).
11
Two female staff members were trained by the author as callers. A script
involving a request for assistance with a questionable gun purchase (detailed below)
was prepared following the model developed by Sorenson and Vittes
17 (personal
communication, Sorenson SB, 2005), with minor modiﬁcation. Responses to
anticipated questions or remarks were drafted by the author and rehearsed by
project staff. Callers were trained to interact with a wide variety of potential
respondents. They then each contacted a random sample of 15 retailers who were
not part of the study population for ﬁnal simulation training. This also provided a
pilot test for the script, which was revised as needed.
Telephone calls were made during April–June, 2005. During this time callers
were regularly debriefed by the author and senior program staff to address any
unforeseen difﬁculties that had arisen.
The script proceeded as follows: After verifying that the respondent was the
subject retailer and still sold handguns, the caller said, “I need to buy a gun for my
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To requests for more information, such as about the gun the boyfriend wanted or his
eligibility to purchase for himself, the caller responded that she did not know. If
asked whether the purchase was a gift, the caller responded that it was not; the
boyfriend just wanted her to purchase it on his behalf. If asked further about
ﬁnancial details, the caller indicated that the purchase was to be for cash and with
the boyfriend’s money; the gun was for the boyfriend, but the caller was to be the
purchaser. If the retailer’s response was negative or equivocal, the caller followed up
with “I’d really like to help him out” or “Is there some way to make this work?” If
the response was positive, the caller asked “How do I do that?” or “What do I need
to do?” and if the information had not already been provided, “Do I need to bring
anything?”
Callers were given no information about the retailers they were contacting other
than a name, telephone number, and address. Calls were not recorded. Immediately
after concluding each call, callers completed a data form and made detailed notes.
The data forms and notes were reviewed by the author as data collection was
underway to screen for unanticipated problems.
In most cases, the retailer’s ﬁnal answer was a straightforward yes or no. There
were ambiguous responses, however, of two types. Some retailers gave a nominally
positive response to the caller’s question when in fact they were recommending a
purchase by the caller and a follow-up private party transfer to the boyfriend. In
California, as these retailers explained, this would require a second purchase
application to be completed by the boyfriend, a background check to verify his
eligibility to own guns, and an additional fee. It seemed clear that their positive
response was not endorsing an illegal straw purchase, but rather a legal retail sale
followed by a legal secondary market transaction. These retailers were classiﬁed as
having provided a qualiﬁed yes.
In other cases, the retailer's nominal response was negative but was accom-
panied by information, and in a few cases explicit coaching, on how the caller could
complete a straw purchase. Still others, while saying no, indicated that this was
because the caller had told them the nature of the transaction and that they would
ignore the caller’s intent if she were to come to the store. These respondents were
classiﬁed as having provided a qualiﬁed no.
The callers’ notes were also reviewed to identify cases in which retailers had
speciﬁcally stated that the purchase as proposed was illegal or used any form of the
phrase “straw purchase.”
Statistical Methods
As before,
10,11 we replaced each retailer’s handgun sales volume with an estimate of
gun-years of exposure to the risk of being traced during the study period for that
retailer’s handguns. Record-based variables for subsets of handgun sales were
expressed as percentages of total gun-years of exposure. The frequency of gun
tracing was expressed as traces per 1,000 gun-years of exposure.
Continuous variables were generally not normally distributed and were
summarized using medians and interquartile ranges. Results for responding and
nonresponding retailers were compared using the Mantel–Haenszel Chi-squared test
for categorical variables and a two-sided Wilcoxon’s rank sum test for continuous
variables. Logistic regression with odds ratios (ORs) and 95% conﬁdence intervals
(CIs) was used to quantify relative risks for the outcome of interest. A multivariate
model was generated by entering all variables with p≤0.30 in bivariate regression
WINTEMUTE 868with purposeful backward elimination until all remaining variables had p≤0.10.
Because of the likelihood of endogeneity, variables specifying whether or not the
retailer described the proposed sale as “illegal” or as a “straw” transaction were not
included in the multivariate model. Interaction terms for all variable pairs in the
reduced model were tested.
The main analysis was restricted to cases in which the retailer’s response was
unambiguously positive or negative. Sensitivity analyses were conducted by adding
the qualiﬁed responses coded either according to their nominal intent or to their
actual intent as inferred by us. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test was used to assess
goodness of ﬁt for multivariate models.
Approval
The study was approved by the UC Davis Institutional Review Board.
RESULTS
Of 300 retailers in the study population, 57 were not contacted because they were
known from both administrative records and site visits to be out of business, were
on military installations, or could not be located (Figure 1). Another 11 were found
to be listings for additional licenses at a single business address. Of 232 retailers for
whom contacts were attempted, 15 could not be reached, 61 no longer sold
handguns, and 7 had no inventory at the time of the call, sold only at auction, or
sold only to police personnel. Of the 151 retailers from whom no response was
obtained, at least 114 (75.5%) were no longer in business or no longer selling
handguns (Figure 1).
The 149 responding retailers and 151 others differed with regard to several
variables that have previously been associated with disproportionate sales of traced
guns (Tables 1 and 2 display principal ﬁndings; complete results are in Supplemental
Licensed handgun retailers
(n=300)
Excluded
￿ Out of business (n=53)
￿ Military (n=3)
￿ Could not be located (n=1)
￿ Duplicate listing (n=11)
Contact attempted
(n=232)
No response to caller’s question
￿ Phone disconnected or no
answer (n=15)
￿ No longer sold handguns
(n=61)
￿ Sold only to police or at auction,
or no inventory (n=7)
Response obtained
(n=149)
FIGURE 1. Flow diagram showing exclusions and reasons for which retailers did not provide a
response.
FIREARM RETAILERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ILLEGAL GUN PURCHASE 869Table 1 in the Electronic Supplementary Materials, available online). Some of these
differences suggested a lower risk for responders; others suggested the opposite. Gun
tracing rates did not differ between the two groups.
Of the 149 completed responses, 30 (20.1%) were positive, 104 (69.8%) were
negative, 5 (3.4%) were qualiﬁed positive, 9 (6.0%) were qualiﬁed negative, and 1
could not be classiﬁed. Of the 30 positive responses, 14 included an explicit warning
that the caller would be responsible for what her boyfriend did with the gun.
Example responses are in Table 3.
Bivariate regression results are in Tables 4 and 5. Calls made by one staff
member were less likely to return a positive response than were calls made by the
other (OR 0.26, 95% CI 0.11–0.62). Pawnbrokers were more likely than other
retailers to respond positively (OR 3.50, 95% CI 1.35–9.10); those who described
the purchase as illegal or as a “straw” transaction were less so. There was no
association between a positive response and the frequency with which a retailer’s
guns were traced, with the percentage of sales that were denied because the
purchasers were ineligible, or with most other characteristics of the retailer, the
retailer’s clientele, or the retailer’s community. Given the strong caller effect,
bivariate regressions for all other variables were repeated with the caller variable
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics for 149 retailers who provided a response and 151 others
(categorical variables)
Characteristics
Responders N=149 Nonresponders N=151
P N % N %
Retailer characteristics
Licensed as pawnbroker 24 16.1 40 26.5 0.028
Nature of retailer’s location:
center city/urban (as
compared to suburban,
small town, or rural)
32 21.5 46 30.5 0.077
Because the descriptive statistics differ, categorical variables and continuous variables are listed separately
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics for 149 retailers who provided a response and 151 others
(continuous variables)
Variable
Responders N=149 Nonresponders N=151
P Median IQR Median IQR
Retailer characteristics
Gun-years of exposure (×1,000) 2.5 1.3–6.1 1.2 0.8–2.2 G0.0001
Traced guns per 1,000 gun-years 1.3 0.5–2.7 1.5 0.4–3.6 0.27
Gun-years from sales of multiple
guns (%)
a
6.4 4.0–9.6 9.1 5.5–14.6 0.0001
Clientele characteristics
Denials, % of (sales+denials) 1.9 1.3–2.4 1.7 0.8–2.5 0.062
Because the descriptive statistics differ, categorical variables and continuous variables are listed separately
IQR interquartile range, CI conﬁdence interval
aSales of more than one handgun in a single transaction (which became illegal in California in 2000)
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boyfriend. He knows what he wants, but asked me to buy it for him. Can I do that?"
Responses coded as “No”
The gentleman said I could pay for the gun, but I could save $30 by not paying the registration
fee twice. I could buy it and register it in my name and pay the $30, if it was a gift for my
boyfriend or something. Then my boyfriend would need to register it in his name and pay
registration fees again. I asked him if I could buy it and give it to my boyfriend. He said
“Nooooooooo, that is an illegal purchase of a handgun.” He said that is a federal crime and
there is a question on the federal document asking if I was going to be in possession of the
gun. And if I answer that wrong, that is perjury and I will have the Feds involved.
“No, that's not legal. If he wants to come in and buy it, he has to take a handgun safety
certiﬁcate test, he has to be over 21, and we have to do a background check on him. I
wouldn't sell you a gun if it's for your boyfriend. It's a straw sale. That's a felony. You can
pay for it but he has to do the background check.”
“You can purchase it for him but he has to do the registration. If you purchased it and put
it in your name and it was used in a crime or it was stolen, it would be found in your name.
You don't want to do that. If they found it at a crime scene, it would be traced back to you.
I followed up with ‘So I can't help him out?’ and he responded, ‘You can purchase it for him
but he has to do the registration.’”
Responses coded as “Yes”
He said “yeah” I could do it and asked if I had handgun safety training in the State of California.
He said I had to take a $25 state test that is 30 questions long. Then I need to bring a utility
bill that is 3 months old with my address on it. He said I could do what I asked, but I
needed to study for the test ﬁrst because I could take it, then I could buy the gun and do
all of the paperwork.
The man asked if I “needed” to buy it for him. I told him my boyfriend wanted me to. He said
“Oh, I get it” and laughed a little and said yes, I could. I asked what I needed to bring with me
and he asked if I was a California resident. He said I needed my driver’s license and my
registration with the same address as my license, or a utility bill with my current address. He
stated if they didn't have the gun I needed, they would order it and take care of me.
He said yes I could and told me to “say it is for you, though.” He said, “you don't want to...you
know.” He said I needed to take an exam. He stated it sounded like I never bought a gun
before. He said it's 50 cents for a handbook to study. It's a 30 question test that is $25 and
lasts for 5 years, if I want to buy any more guns. Then I need proof of residency like a phone
bill or utility bill. He said after the gun is paid in full, then my 10 day waiting period starts.
“Yes,” including a warning
The gentleman said I could buy the gun, but if anything happens to it, I am responsible. He
said I could register it in my name, but if my boyfriend does something with it, it will come
back to me. He also said I could pay for it and do the background check on me and my
boyfriend can register it and it would cost him $75. He said he just wanted to make clear to
me that if I register it and give it to my boyfriend and we break up, I am still responsible. He
said if I had it stolen or lost it, to report it. He said you could still do it, but it's up to you.
The gentleman said the gun would be in my name and asked if I knew this. He said if I
wanted to come in and do all of the stuff in my name and my boyfriend goes out and
shoots somebody and I am willing to take the rap for it, then I could. After telling him that
was ﬁne, he said he really wasn't supposed to know what I was doing with the gun after I left.
He said I needed to bring a valid ID and the money when I come down.
“Yes,” describing purchase as illegal or as a straw transaction
The gentleman said he could sell me a handgun. He said my boyfriend would need to come
down and do the paperwork. He said if he did sell me the gun, it is called a straw “purpose”
and he and I could both go to jail. He said now if I came in and bought it, whatever I did
after I left was of no concern to him. He stated again he could sell me one.
FIREARM RETAILERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ILLEGAL GUN PURCHASE 871added. The results were unchanged (Supplemental Table 2 in the Electronic
Supplementary Materials, available online).
In a reduced multivariate model (Table 6), strong effects remained for the caller,
the retailer’s status as a pawnbroker, and the retailer’s location in a center city or
urban area. Terms for interactions between each pair of variables in the reduced
model were not signiﬁcant.
Results for the sensitivity analyses, in which the qualiﬁed responses were added
and coded according to either their nominal or inferred actual intent, were very
similar to those for the main analysis (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
Twenty percent of the licensed ﬁrearm retailers in our study population agreed to
assist a potential handgun buyer with a transaction that had many attributes of an
illegal surrogate or “straw” purchase. Others, while saying no, offered the buyer
concrete assistance in completing a purchase they appeared to understand was
against the law. In multivariate analysis, pawnbrokers were more than six times as
likely as gun dealers to give a positive response.
High as it is, our “yes” rate is much lower than the 52.5% found by Sorenson
and Vittes.
17 Differences in study populations may account for much of this. Our
sample was drawn from all retailers exceeding a modest threshold sales volume in a
state that regulates and polices gun commerce to a degree that is perhaps unique. In
their study, retailers were drawn from an Internet business directory, which may
cause high-volume retailers to be overrepresented, and were located throughout the
country.
Responses coded as “Qualiﬁed Yes”
a
He said yes, but I ﬁrst needed [a Handgun Safety Card], which is $25 and 30 questions. He said
then I needed to do a background check that is an additional $25 on top of the price of the
gun. I will then have to wait 10 days before I can pick up the gun. I asked if at that point I
could pick it up and give it to my boyfriend. He said “yes, but the right way.” He said I
needed to transfer it into my boyfriend’s name, which costs an additional $45, and
then my boyfriend will need to pay and take the HSC test and the same for the background
check. He said California states it needs to be in my boyfriend’s name.
Responses coded as “Qualiﬁed No”
b
The gentleman said “technically no.” He said there is a thing called a Straw Purchase Bylaw
and because I told him my intent, I cannot buy a gun in my name and give it to my
boyfriend. For all the man knew, my boyfriend could be a felon and not supposed to have the
gun. I can come in and get a gift certiﬁcate that my boyfriend can use. Or I can buy the gun
and my boyfriend can come in and register for it. I then followed up with, “I couldn't do it?”
He said if I didn't tell them and I just came down and bought it and gave it to him, they
wouldn't know.
“Yeah, if you’re buying it for yourself, as long as you pass the background check through the
DOJ, ﬁll out the paperwork, and register it in your name. But no, you can't buy one for him.
He has to buy it and register it in his name. If for whatever reason he can't pass a background
check, I didn't hear that. In the future, if you are calling around and want to buy it for him,
I would keep that mum.”
aA nominal “yes” response that appeared to be an endorsement for a sale to the caller followed by a legal
private party sale to her boyfriend
bA nominal “no” response accompanied by information on how the caller could complete a straw purchase
WINTEMUTE 872Many of our ﬁndings were unexpected. First was the ambiguity of the purchase
request as presented. An unexpectedly high number of retailers understood the
transaction to be a gift, even though the script was designed to make it clear that this
was not the case. Following Sorenson and Vittes,
17 we had purposely not scripted a
completely transparent request for assistance with a straw purchase, believing that
this would not be realistic.
Second was the lack of association between a positive response and previously
identiﬁed risk factors for disproportionate sales of traced crime guns.
8,10,11 One
possible explanation is simply that there is no association between a retailer’s
propensity to engage in illegal activity and that retailer’s risk for selling guns that are
used in crime. This fails a basic test of plausibility. Another is that at least some of
those risk factors have been wrongly identiﬁed and that no association between
them and propensity to engage in illegal activity (or risk for selling crime guns)
should be expected. This is also unlikely, at least as a comprehensive explanation,
since those risk factors have been identiﬁed in repeated studies on different
populations using different methods.
8,10,11,18,19
However, the use of gun tracing data to gauge retailers’ willingness to engage in
unlawful activity, or even to measure their sales of guns that are later used in crime,
has been questioned before.
20,21 It is clear that not all crime guns are recovered by
law enforcement agencies, that not all recovered guns are traced, and that selection
bias may arise at each of these points.
22 The impact of this will be less in states such
as California, where many cities trace all recovered guns, than elsewhere.
23
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics and results of bivariate regressions (categorical variables)
Characteristic
Said “Yes” N=30 Said “No” N=104
OR 95% CI P N % N %
Variables intrinsic to
telephone call
Call made by staff
member #1
9 30.0 65 62.5 0.26 0.11 0.62 0.002
Retailer described
purchase as “illegal”
3 10.0 53 51.0 0.11 0.03 0.37 0.0005
Retailer described
purchase as “straw”
2 6.7 30 28.9 0.18 0.04 0.79 0.023
Retailer characteristics
Licensed as pawnbroker 10 33.3 13 12.5 3.50 1.35 9.10 0.01
In or G25 mi from city
with comprehensive
tracing
11 36.7 44 42.3 0.79 0.34 1.83 0.58
Nature of retailer’s
location: center
city/urban (as
compared to
suburban, small
town, or rural)
2 6.7 24 23.1 0.24 0.05 1.07 0.062
Variables are grouped by the entity they describe: the telephone call itself, the retailer, the retailer’s
clientele, or the county in which the retailer is located. Because the descriptive statistics differ, categorical
variables and continuous variables are listed separately
OR odds ratio, CI conﬁdence interval
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FIREARM RETAILERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ILLEGAL GUN PURCHASE 875The nature of our responding retailers may provide a partial explanation. The
risk factor data were gathered for 1998–2003, and the interviews were conducted in
2005. Three-fourths of the nonresponders had gone out of business or were no
longer selling handguns. In California, where retailers must also have state licenses,
where the state Department of Justice has its own retailer inspection program and
where enforcement is generally more active than elsewhere, it is possible that many
of our nonresponders had been put out of business through enforcement action. If
so, our unexpected ﬁndings may result in part from survival bias.
We believe the most important explanation is the ambiguity of the question we
posed to retailers. By not portraying the nature of the purchase more explicitly, we
may have created a screening test that was highly sensitive, but not speciﬁc enough.
This is particularly important since sales of traced crime guns generally, and
disproportionate sales of those guns in particular, are concentrated among a very
small percentage of licensed retailers.
8–11 Sorenson and Vittes conducted a sensitivity
analysis in which 20 retailers were told, “My girl/boyfriend needs me to buy her/him
a handgun because s/he isn’t allowed to.”
17 Four retailers said yes to this
unambiguous request for assistance in committing a felony, and their speciﬁc verbal
responses were similar to those observed in this study.
Our ﬁndings are subject to several limitations. Precisely because of the unusual
nature of gun commerce in California, generalizability is limited. Second, because our
population was originally created for a case–control study of retailers with dispropor-
tionate sales of crime guns, such retailers are overrepresented. We anticipated that this
might affect the frequency of our outcome of interest (though, as shown in Tables 4
and 5, this did not appear to occur), but it should not affect relative risk estimates.
Last is the strong association between saying “yes” and the staff member who
placed the call. We deliberately had all calls placed by women in order to avoid a
possible gender bias on the part of respondents and also because of the ﬁnding that
women may ﬁgure disproportionately among straw purchasers.
7 Callers adhered
closely to the script, both in text and in tone. The caller with the higher proportion
of “No” responses was a few years younger and had a signiﬁcantly higher voice, and
respondents may have been inﬂuenced by her perceived youth. The effect appeared
to be independent of those for other variables, but more attention to elimination of
factors that may give rise to an interviewer effect will be necessary in future studies.
These limitations notwithstanding, screening by telephone appears to hold
promise as a cost-effective technique for cities impacted by gun violence and others
to identify ﬁrearm retailers who may be willing to engage in suspect and illegal sales.
Future studies will be needed to reﬁne and validate this technique.
TABLE 6 Reduced regression model
Characteristic OR 95% CI P
Variables intrinsic to telephone call
Call made by staff member #1 0.23 0.09 0.59 0.002
Retailer characteristics
Licensed as pawnbroker 6.58 1.99 21.71 0.002
Nature of retailer’s location:
center city/urban (as compared to
suburban, small town, or rural)
0.10 0.02 0.57 0.01
Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness of ﬁt test, P=0.35
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